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WHOSE WORLD AND HOW? 
Milner S. Ball* 
RETHINKING THE AMERICAN RACE PROBLEM. By Roy L. Brooks. 
Berkeley: University of California Press. 1990. Pp. xiv, 256. Cloth, 
$24.95; paper, $13. 
I. THE RACE PROBLEM IN AMERICA 
The 1893 World's Columbian Exposition in Chicago marked the 
four-hundredth anniversary of Columbus' "discovery" of America. 
Its designers intended the Exposition to provide instruction in human 
evolutionary advancement; the pedagogical exhibits along the midway 
were arranged chronologically, from grass huts and half-naked 
savages to the beginnings of modern civilization in a Teutonic village. 
Then came, across a bridge, the triumphant White City. The progres-
sion formed, as William McFeely recently observed, "an all-too-pow-
erful metaphor of the dominance of white people over those of color." 1 
Frederick Douglass accepted appointment as commissioner of 
Haiti's pavilion at the Exposition. He and Ida Wells distributed to 
visitors a pamphlet describing the fair as a "whited sepulcher."2 They 
sought to counter the white racial triumphalism by drawing attention 
to black Americans' accomplishments and to their continuing oppres-
sion. To advance the cause, Douglass planned a grand occasion in 
August - Colored People's Day at the fair. He would give a speech 
on the subject of "The Race Problem in America," to be followed by 
brilliant young performers including the poet Paul Laurence Dunbar, 
and the musicians Will Marion Cook and Joseph Douglass, Freder-
ick's grandson. 3 
When the day arrived, however, Exposition vendors mockingly of-
fered watermelons for sale, and, as Douglass began his address, white 
hecklers at the rear of the crowd interrupted him. The aged cam-
paigner faltered. His hand shook. But then he summoned strength, 
cast aside his papers, stood down the catcalls, and took command of 
the audience with his great voice: 
"Men talk of the Negro problem," Douglass roared. "There is no 
Negro problem. The problem is whether the American people have loy-
* Caldwell Professor of Constitutional Law, University of Georgia. A.B. 1958, Princeton; 
S.T.B. 1961, Harvard; J.D. 1971, University of Georgia. - Ed. 
1. WILLIAM s. MCFEELY, FREDERICK DOUGLASS 368 (1991). I have followed McFeely's 
account of the Chicago fair. 
2. Id. at 369. 
3. Id. at 371. 
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alty enough, honor enough, patriotism enough, to live up to their own 
Constitution." On he went for an hour: "We Negroes love our country. 
We fought for it. We ask only that we be treated as well as those who 
fought against it."4 
The speech cleared a space for the young performers. They and he 
redeemed the day. The rich accomplishments of black Americans 
were celebrated. 
But the plight of black Americans in a nation plagued by lynchings 
remained unchanged. "The land in which Douglass now spoke his 
mind was not the one he had worked so hard to achieve. . . . The 
Chicago fair was a world gone sour."5 
II. A WAY OF THINKING ABOUT THE RA.CE PROBLEM 
One hundred years later, the five-hundredth anniversary of Colum-
bus' "discovery" is upon us, and America is different. Lynchings have 
ceased (Justice Clarence Thomas' description of his confirmation hear-
ings to the contrary notwithstanding). Troops have returned from an-
other war in which African Americans not only fought but also 
commanded. Instead of touting a supposed evolution toward white 
supremacy, "discovery" celebrations this time around have been 
forced to acknowledge both the minority status of whites in the world 
and the remarkable contributions of people of color, including those 
who discovered this continent and welcomed Europeans when they 
came. 
Even so, the nation has not yet proved able finally to shake off 
white supremacy in either its blatant or its subtle, scarcely conscious 
forms. "The Race Problem in America" endures. Professor Roy 
Brooks6 has sought "to bring some creative energy" to rethinking it 
(p. 171). Abundant creative energy is as necessary for a twentieth-
century liberal like Brooks as it was for a nineteenth-century liberal 
like Douglass. There is as much tension now as then, for, with accom-
plishment by African Americans rising, oppression of them does not 
correspondingly recede. 
On the Chicago occasion, Douglass spoke of Americans' failure to 
live up to "their" Constitution and of Negroes' loving "our" country. 
In another speech delivered much earlier in his career, the famous 
"What to the Slave is the Fourth of July?" Douglass had noted to his 
white audience: "This Fourth [ ot] July is yours, not mine. " 1 Douglass 
4. Id. 
5. Id. at 371-72. 
6. Professor of Law, University of Minnesota. 
7. FREDERICK DOUGLASS, ORATION DELIVERED IN CORINTHIAN HALL, ROCHESTER, 
JULY 5TH, 1852, reprinted in 2 THE FREDERICK DOUGLASS PAPERS 359, 368 (John w. Blassin-
game ed., 1982). Douglass had a keen sense for discrepancy. He agreed to give the speech only 
when it was moved from July 4 to July 5. His participation in the Chicago Exposition may have 
been rendered symbolically more tolerable for him because it was held in 1893 instead of 1892. 
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did as much as any individual to make "your" freedom encompass 
"our" freedom and to make "their" Constitution embrace the origi-
nally omitted right of equal protection, 8 but to the end of Douglass' 
long life "their" Constitution, country, and freedom remained un-
equally separated from "ours" - loved, fought for, and enriched 
though "ours" had been by "us." 
The discrepancies and tensions continue. Professor Brooks' re-
sponse to them follows the Douglass pattern. On "their" side, he 
would have the majority live up to their Constitution; on "our" side, 
he would highlight black accomplishment and put it to use within the 
black community. He makes fresh entries on both sides. On the one, 
he calls for constitutional and statutory law more responsive to the 
diverse needs of different African-American classes. On the other, he 
advocates self-help: African-American middle-class families should 
help African-American families in the working and poverty classes. 
III. "THEIR" LAW: THE MIDDLE AND WORKING CLASSES 
Current civil rights policies, says Brooks, are conceptually sound 
but so operationally flawed that they do not produce equal opportu-
nity for the races and in fact "accommodate, prolong, and intensify 
intra-class racial disparity" (p. 5). He proposes that policy and law be 
reformed to take into account the economic status of the purported 
beneficiaries. 
Brooks divides African Americans into three economically deter-
mined classes: middle class, working class, and poverty class. He in-
cludes the upper class (over $75,000 annual income) within the middle 
class ($25,000 to $75,000) because there are so few African Americans 
in the former category. The working class is above and the poverty 
class below the $10,000 divide. The three classes contain roughly 
equal percentages of the total African-American population (p. 38). 
Within each of the classes, African Americans confront race-based 
obstacles that whites within the same class do not face. Brooks sees 
this as the configuration of the race problem, and he argues that solu-
tions of it must be class-responsive. What works in one class may be 
inappropriate or even inimical to another: while integration is appro-
priate in the middle and working classes, only a careful form oflimited 
separatism can help poor African-American families. Brooks recom-
mends revised civil rights law at the upper end of the class scale and 
economic reform at the lower. 
For example, application of the strict scrutiny test in equal protec-
tion litigation works against middle-class African Americans because 
it commands race neutrality "at the wrong time. Except in a very Iim-
8. See Milner S. Ball, Stories of Origin and Constitutional Possibilities, 81 MICH. L. REV. 
2280, 2282-85, 2293-94 (1989). 
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ited situation, it enjoins the public sector's use of race-conscious em-
ployment policies or practices that would promote racial inclusion" 
and makes "it extremely difficult for a public employer to voluntarily 
use racial classifications for the purposes of assisting qualified African 
Americans in catching up with their white counterparts" (p. 53). Suits 
brought under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 are difficult to 
pursue and more difficult to win because of judicial interpretation that 
"may even encourage would-be discriminators."9 
Although African Americans in the working class suffer no less 
employment discrimination than those in the middle class (so that 
beneficial changes in employment discrimination law would aid them 
as well), Brooks focuses instead on their need for housing and educa-
tion. For example, claims of constitutionally impermissible exclusion 
of minorities from housing and educational possibilities have been ren-
dered nugatory by the requirement that the actions be shown to be 
racially discriminatory in intent.10 Moreover, the Fair Housing Act 
"for years conveyed to would-be discriminators and segregationists in 
words and deeds that the federal government was not terribly inter-
ested in opposing housing discrimination or segregation."11 
Because the American race problem in the middle and working 
classes is exacerbated in these instances by the way civil rights law is 
implemented, Brooks advocates operational reform: "[F]ederal deci-
sion makers and policy makers [should] give greater attention and 
weight to the societal objective of formal equal opportunity - racial 
inclusion" (p. 152). The government's conceptual end is fine; the 
means must be more appropriately tailored to it. 
Accordingly, to promote the interest of the African-American 
middle class, "[t]he government must simply cure certain defects in 
Title VII antidiscrimination law and in racial preference, or affirma-
tive action, law."12 For the working class, the government must un-
9. P. 64. Brooks explains: 
Required only to produce evidence probative of a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for 
disparate treatment and protected by the but-for or substantial-factor standard, as well as by 
the unitary litigation model and the preponderance of evidence standard in mixed-motive 
cases, an employer has a real opportunity to discriminate - whether the motivation is ra-
cism or some perceived economic benefit - and to get away with lying about it. 
P. 64. It remains to be seen to what degree or whether the Civil Rights Act of 1991, enacted after 
Brooks wrote, will have rendered Title VII more effective for civil rights plaintiffs. 
10. See, e.g., p. 96 (citing Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717 (1974) (education)); p. 84 (citing, 
inter alia, Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252 (1977) 
(land use)). 
11. P. 92. See pp. 90-92 (criticizing poor structure and administration of Act, exemptions for 
certain discriminators, and impotent sanctions). 
12. P. 153. See pp. 153-57 (proposing five changes: (1) shifting the burden of persuasion to 
the defendant; (2) replacing the substantial-factor standard with the taint standard in disparate 
treatment cases; (3) adopting the bifurcated litigation model (separating liability and remedy) 
over the unitary model in mixed-motive cases; (4) employing the clear and convincing evidence 
standard rather than preponderance of evidence standard in mixed-motive cases; and (5) apply-
ing antidiscrimination requirements to high-level enforcement). 
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dertake more detailed changes. For example, Title VII remedies must 
be made more accessible to working class laborers through the crea-
tion of a new agency empowered to sue on behalf of individuals (p. 
157). Another new agency should be created to enforce antidis-
crimination housing law (p. 159). Equal protection litigation in hous-
ing and education should be rendered more viable by replacing the 
discriminatory intent test with an effects test (pp. 158, 160-61). And 
"a frontal assault on the strict scrutiny test" should be mounted with a 
view to having the Supreme Court adopt in its place the test employed 
in Title VII litigation, which allows "voluntary racial preference pro-
grams as long as the programs are designed to promote racial inclu-
sion and do not 'unnecessarily trammel the interests' of the group 
disadvantaged by the racial classification."13 
IV. "OUR" COMMUNITY: THE POVERTY CLASS 
African Americans in the· poverty class, like those in the other 
classes, suffer from discrimination in employment, housing, and edu-
cation. But they must bear additional burdens peculiar to the class. 
As middle- and working-class African Americans have been drawn 
out of previously segregated communities, the poor have been left be-
hind. Racial integration thus "helps to open a cultural and economic 
abyss in communities already suffering from the lingering effects of 
slavery and Jim Crow, creating an underworld of dysfunction and self-
destruction into which millions of African Americans have fallen" (p. 
14). 
For these millions, adjustments of civil rights law will have little 
moment. Brooks therefore proposes two additional, massive re-
sponses: an employment opportunities program, and a program of 
household support of poverty-class African-American families by mid-
dle-class African-American families. 
The employment program would be initiated by the government. 
It would not guarantee jobs but would offer job training and transi-
tional income support. Tax incentives would help create private sector 
jobs. "Employers would be involved in job training and perhaps in 
transportation to workplaces. Child care services could involve local 
schools, churches, employers, parents, or governmental assistance" (p. 
21). 
Because the government is unlikely to undertake such measures, 
and because he believes "that racial separation can be helpful" to the 
African-American poverty class (p. 125), Brooks concludes that the 
African-American community will have to help itself through middle-
class involvement with the poverty class. "[W]hite Americans can and 
must continue to offer assistance to African American households and 
13. P. 163 (quoting United Steelworkers v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193, 208 (1979)). 
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institutions in whatever way feasible," but "members of the African 
American middle class are likely to be the most effective and the most 
desirable guides for working-class and poor African American house-
holds" because they "possess certain unique skills and knowledge from 
how to deal with a racist boss or co-worker to how to tap into the 
African American ethos for strength and perseverance" (p. 20). 
Brooks believes 
[m]iddle-class African Americans must attempt to redirect the dysfunc-
tional and self-defeating mores afilicting those who form the underclass 
subculture. They must do so by teaching not only mainstream American 
behaviors, values, and attitudes (including the work ethic) but also sur-
vival techniques for African Americans coping with a racist society .... 
[T]hese skills can be taught only on a long-term, one-to-one, "adopt a 
family" basis. [p. 21] 
The teachable skills would include successful living in American 
society, finding and using available community resources, and coping 
with racist colleagues and institutions (p. 133). Teaching and student 
families could be matched formally through traditional institutions 
like churches or informally through extended family connections (pp. 
134-35). The tutoring would impart a central psychological lesson: 
"You have the right to be angry about centuries of racial exploitation 
as well as present-day racism and racial discrimination. But you do 
not have the right to dwell on that anger, to feel guilty about these 
matters, to suffer low self-esteem, or to react in other self-destructive 
ways" (pp. 143-44). The chief outcome to be hoped for would be a 
new sense among poverty-class African Americans "that sacrifice, per-
severance, the church, and an understanding of 'the system' connect in 
a way that informs a unique worldview - a distinct African American 
perspective" which "acknowledges that life is especially hard and un-
fair for African Americans," but also "asserts that they always find the 
strength to pull through. African American culture thus becomes a 
point of racial pride and a rallying cry all in one" (p. 146). 
V. EXPECTATION 
Professor Brooks writes with verve. He is winsomely, affectingly 
committed to strategic resolution of the race problem and to specific, 
immediate reforms that can make life better now for individuals des-
perately pinched by racism and poverty. That is reason enough to 
read his book. His proposals are marked by hope and readiness for 
action. His two points of primary focus - that economic circum-
stances of African Americans must be contextually reckoned with, 
and that African-American self-help is communally necessary and 
possible - are well taken. The book should also help provoke whites 
to reassess their own role in the past and future of the race problem. 
Rethinking the American Race Problem has been accurately de-
scribed as an "example of thoughtful liberal analysis" familiar to read-
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ers of law reviews. 14 It exhibits characteristics that have brought 
liberalism under attack by African-American scholars from both the 
right and the left. 
For example, Brooks accepts the existing civil rights apparatus and 
proposes reforming it to serve rather than frustrate the interests of 
middle-class African Americans. But are not the institutions of civil 
rights, as he also points out, an important source of the problem? 
Would not his civil reform efforts constitute further entrenchment of 
the system? Who would benefit from new civil rights agencies? 
Would not adjusted standards of judicial review be additional litter 
along the winding trail of interpretive delay and disappointment? 
Would not a frontal assault on strict scrutiny, like most other frontal 
assaults, produce carnage but no real gains? Whom is Brooks address-
ing, with what prospects and provisions at hand, when he says "the 
federal courts must reallocate the burden of persuasion ... and change 
the substantive standard of causation" in certain Title VII cases; 
"must adopt a different litigation model" in other cases; "and must 
end their reluctance to apply antidiscrimination law to high-level posi-
tions" (p. 18)? 
Similarly, Brooks accepts "the existing direction of our society" 
and so proposes that economic remedies for the plight of working-
class African Americans "must not attempt to effect a fundamental 
social transformation" and "must recognize the limited role that gov-
ernment plays ... " (p. 15). But does not the existing direction of our 
society lead in a circle around the race problem? Who will most bene-
fit from training for jobs that it is hoped can be cajoled from indus-
tries? And what is entailed when Brooks says "government must ... 
create a special support system for African Americans ... " (p. 14)? 
Compare his own earlier advice that 
serious thought must be given to the possibility that all the government's 
clatter about civil rights and equal rights and racial equality is nothing 
more than a bill of goods - a running promise of forty acres and a mule 
- sold to our anxiously hopeful and unsuspecting kith and kin and that 
what the government ultimately means by "civil rights" is that African 
Americans must fend for themselves. [pp. 2-3] 
Brooks is of two minds. He realizes how little the civil rights appa-
ratus is designed to do for black Americans in comparison to how 
14. Richard Delgado, Enormous Anomaly? Left-Right Parallels in Recent Writing About 
Race, 91 CoLUM. L. REV. 1547, 1547 n.1 (1991) (book review). Professor Delgado notes that 
such classic-liberal writing, 
highly normative and rights-based in nature but cautiously incremental in scope and ambi-
tion, criticizes Supreme Court opinions, decries our recent inattention to the plight of wo-
men and persons of color, and urges a renewed commitment to racial justice. It accepts the 
dominant paradigm of civil rights scholarship and activism, and urges that we work harder 
- litigate more furiously, press for new legislation, exhort each other more fervently than 
ever before - within that paradigm. 
Id. at 1547-48 (footnotes omitted). 
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much it yields for white Americans' self-estimation of their own good 
intentions. Nevertheless he counsels that "African Americans must 
continue to knock on the door; they must continue to demand legal 
and economic assistance from the government" (p. 2). 
Continuing to play the game has its attractions, primary among 
them the scarcity of real alternatives. What are the other possibilities? 
The suggestion from the right - from Stephen Carter15 and Shelby 
Steele, 16 for example - is individual achievement: forget the conde-
scending aid and beat them at their own game. The suggestion from 
the left-from Derrick Bell17 and Patricia Williams,18 for example-
is community transfiguration of the universe of possibilities: bring in a 
new game.19 The first alternative is fine for the modem Chicago prod-
igy Michael Jordan and the few others who will grow deservedly rich, 
but little else is likely to trickle down from it. The second alternative 
holds promise, but the conditions for its realization are not yet gener-
ally or immediately present. So Professor Richard Delgado comes to 
the bleak conclusion that "in the short run liberalism will continue to 
decline, and nothing coherent will replace it, while conditions for 
blacks and other people of color will worsen. Race, our most enduring 
problem, is likely to remain, for now, as intractable as ever."20 
African Americans of the middle, the right, and the left must still 
contend with the Douglass dilemma: how to be "me" and "us," given 
"them" and "their" city. Brooks regards his book's most important 
message to be "that a new form of self-help offers the best hope for 
improving socio-economic conditions among African Americans" (p. 
xiv). Distinctive African-American culture "as a point of racial pride 
and a rallying cry" (p. 146) may indeed be the best hope for solution of 
the race problem, so long as its celebration does more than equip peo-
ple for accommodation to the White City. Certainly there is a remark-
able, substantial tradition of creative as well as resistant mutual help 
within the African-American community. 
In Brooks' estimation, however, self-help must work together with 
governmental remedies. Is the appropriate complement to African-
American self-help an adjusted civil rights policy dependent upon the 
benevolence of the established powers? Or might the just complement 
be some new departure in the white community, something unsenti-
15. See STEPHEN L. CARTER, REFLECTIONS OF AN AFFIRMATIVE ACTION BABY (1991). 
16. See SHELBY STEELE, THE CoNTENT OF OUR CHARACTER: A NEW VISION OF RACE IN 
AMERICA (1990). 
17. See DERRICK BELL, AND WE ARE NOT SAVED: THE ELUSIVE QUEST FOR RACIAL 
JUSTICE (1987). 
18. See PATRICIA J. WILLIAMS, THE ALCHEMY OF RACE AND RIGHTS: THE DIARY OF A 
LAW PROFESSOR (1991) (reviewed in this issue by Professor Robin L. West - Ed.). 
19. See Milner S. Ball, The Legal Academy and Minority Scholars, 103 HARV. L. REv. 1855 
(1990). 
20. Delgado, supra note 14, at 1560. 
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mental and unromantic like obedience to righteousness together with a 
capacity for listening and understanding? The reality of miracle has 
been established in the recent politics of other nations. Miracle is not 
foreclosed from the future of relations between races in this one. We 
may choose to act as though, by the six-hundredth anniversary of Co-
lumbus' transatlantic voyage, "our" freedom will have been created 
together with, rather than over or against, "theirs." 
